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LEGISLATIVE REFORM

The Americans with Disabilities Act:
You Can't Honestly Believe That!
This Note will focus on a nascent split between the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
over whether or not a plaintiff, in the context of a discrimination case under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),' can attack the underlying reasonableness of the
nondiscriminatory reasons that the defendant has put forth when the plaintiff attempts
to show pretext.2 Part I will briefly introduce the ADA and one of the means, pretext,
by which an aggrieved plaintiff may make a showing of discrimination under the
ADA. Part II will briefly describe the "honest belief' rule, a defense a defendant may
use in defeating a plaintiffs showing of pretext. Part III will set out the split between
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits with respect to the "honest belief' rule. Part IV will
attempt to analyze the two positions in the context of the basic aims and policy underlying the ADA. Part V will conclude that the Sixth Circuit's position is the preferable position, and that Congress ought to amend the ADA to reflect this position.
I. Introduction
In 1990 Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act, legislation designed to overcome discrimination based on disability, whether real or perceived.'
"The thesis of the [ADA] is simply this: That people with disabilities ought to be
judged on the basis of their abilities; they should not be judged nor discriminated
against based on unfounded fear, prejudice, ignorance, or mythologies; people ought to
be judged based upon the relevant medical evidence and the abilities they have."4
Claims of discrimination under the ADA are treated by courts in a manner similar to
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.- This includes allowing a

1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. The split concerns a line of cases in the 7th Circuit, ending with Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997) and a new case from the 6th Circuit, Smith v. Chrysler
Corp., 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998), which explicitly rejected the 7th Circuit's reasoning.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) ("Being regarded as having such an impairment."). See also Griffin
v. Steeltek, Inc., 160 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a job applicant need not make a
showing that he or she is disabled or perceived as having a disability to state a prima facie case
under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2), the section of ADA dealing with impermissable employment application questions).
4. 136 Cong. Rec. 9, 13051 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin during debate over Chapman
Amendment to the ADA).
5. See Kariotis, 131 F.3d at 676 (applying the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to an ADA claim); Smith, 155 F.3d at 805 (applying the
McDonnell Douglas framework to an ADA claim); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461 (7th Cir.
1997) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to an ADA claim). See also Catherine J. Lanctot,
The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 57, 62 at n.14 (1991) (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas
framework has been applied to discrimination suits under a variety of federal statutes).
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plaintiff to show disparate treatment either by direct evidence of discrimination or by
indirect, circumstantial evidence.6
A claim based on indirect, circumstantial evidence is usually referred to as a
pretext claim.7 To make a pretext claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must follow the
burden-shifting framework first set out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.8 Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff
must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. A prima facie case requires that the plaintiff show: 1) that the plaintiff is a
member a class protected by the statute, 2) that the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question, 3) that the plaintiff suffered an adverse decision by the defendant, and
4) that the position remained open to others whose qualifications were similar to the
plaintiff's.9 A successful prima facie showing creates a presumption of discrimination
against the defendant. The defendant can then rebut this presumption by "articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"'" for the action the plaintiff is challenging as
discriminatory. Once the defendant produces such evidence, the presumption evaporates," and the plaintiff must now show that the defendant's stated reasons are pretext
for prohibited discrimination.2

6. See, e.g., Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507. 512-14 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing the difference between direct versus circumstantial proof in a Title VII case).
7. See John L. Flynn, Note, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy
Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEo. LJ. 2009, 2028 at n. 104 (1995) ("They derive their name
from the last stage of their succession of proof.").
8. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas was a Title
VII discrimination case, but the framework developed in this case has since been applied to employment discrimination under a variety of federal statutes; see e.g. Catherine J.Lanctot, supra note 5, 62
at n.14 (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas framework has been used under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967); the Employee Retirement Investment
Security Act(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974); and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1866)). See also Lianne C. Knych, Note, Assessing the Application of McDonnell Douglas to Employment Discrimination Claims Brought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 79 MiNN. L. REv.
1515, 1516 (1995) (noting that various courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in interpreting the ADA and providing a sample list of such cases).
9. This is an example of the usual requirements for a prima facie showing; the actual requirements will differ from case to case depending on the facts, as the Court noted in McDonnell Douglas,
"The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie
proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U.S. at 802, n.13.
10. Id.
11. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 at n. 10 (1981).
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-804. This framework from McDonnell Douglas has been
refined by the Court in Burdine, United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
(1983), and St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) but the basic framework of: 1) prima facie showing, 2) rebuttal, and 3) showing of pretext remains that articulated in Mcdonnell Douglas.
The second two aspects of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the rebuttal of the presumption
and the effect thereof, and the subsequent showing of pretext have been the subject of much pretext
discrimination litigation, including Burdine, Aikens, and Hicks. Much of this litigation has focused on
whether or not one of the two parties is entitled to summary judgment, or can survive summary judgment, without a direct showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant. The circuits have
also split over these issues, with several deciding that the plaintiff has made her case without such a
showing, and the others deciding that the plaintiff must make such a showing in order to survive summary judgment. The two positions can be roughly summed up as the Pretext-only and the Pretext-plus
positions. See Lanctot, supra at note 8 for a discussion of these two positions and how the circuits
split (as of 1991). See also Note, The Plaintiffs Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases: Discrimination Vel Non-St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), 73 NEB. L. REv. 953
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Once the defendant has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to support its actions, the plaintiff must attempt to show pretext. 3 That is, the plaintiff must
show either "that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer"' 4 or
that the defendant's reasons are "unworthy of credence."' 5 "An employee can show
pretext by offering evidence that the employer's proffered reason had no basis in fact,
did not actually motivate its decision, or was never used in the past to discharge an
employee."'" Plaintiffs will often attempt to show that the defendant's reason had no
basis in fact, e.g. that the employer mistakenly believed that an employee's clothing
contained an inflammatory message, 7 that the employer mistakenly believed that the
employee referred to a client improperly, that the employer mistakenly believed that
the employee lied to receive disability benefits, 9 or that the employer mistakenly believed that the employee had lied on an application form.2'
If the plaintiff succeeds in showing that a defendant's proffered reason had no
basis in fact, the defendant can respond by claiming that, notwithstanding the lack of
factual support, the defendant honestly believed the proffered reason, and that therefore
it is not a pretext for some other motive-the "honest belief' rule.
The rationale behind the "honest belief' rule is that since the focus of a discrimination suit is the defendant's intent to discriminate, any reason that the defendant hon2
estly believes cannot, by definition, be a pretext for some prohibited motive. ' The
practical effect of the rule is that a plaintiff may not survive a motion for summary
judgment.22 Whether or not a plaintiff does survive such a motion will depend on
how the deciding court applies the honest belief rule.
HI. The Problem: The Split between the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits over the
Application of the Honest Belief Rule
It follows that, if one honestly believes in the reason one gives for one's actions,
then that reason cannot be a pretext for some other motivation. "[W]hen the employer
advances a reason unrelated to a characteristic covered by the statute, the issue 'be-

(1994).
This Note will not directly discuss the question of pretext-only or pretext-plus but will conclude,
in Part V, that the preferable position with respect to the "honest belief' rule harmonizes with a third
position. That position follows from, the author believes, an attentive reading of the cases and implies
that pretext-only ought to be sufficient (usually) for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment, but not
enough to entitle plaintiff to summary judgment.
13. The defendant need not show that the reasons it offers were the actual reasons for its actions,
merely that a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions exists. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at
510 (quoting Burdine).
14. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
15. Id.
16. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Koscis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 883 (6th Cir. 1996)).
17. Toyee v. Reno, 940 F. Supp. 1081, 1093 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (wearing a Malcolm X T-shirt).
18. Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1271 (7th Cir. 1997) ('referred to a client as an
'idiot"').
19. Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 1997) (degree of mobility
after knee surgery).
20. Smith, 155 F.3d at 804 (lying on a self-administered medical form).
21. Id. at 806 (discussing the rule as applied by the 7th Circuit).
22. See Kariotis, 131 F.3d at 674.
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comes one of credibility in determining whether the belief is genuinely held' rather

than whether the belief is correct."23
A. The Seventh Circuit's Position
The Seventh Circuit has developed its version of the "honest belief' rule through
a series of cases culminating with its decision in Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Transp.
Corp.24 The Seventh Circuit applied the honest belief rule strictly and Kariotis lost a

motion for summary judgment: "if the company honestly believed in those reasons, the
plaintiff loses even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or baseless."' Two cases are
illustrative of the Seventh Circuit's development of the rule, leading up to Kariotis:
Pollard v. REA Magnet Wire Co.' and McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting
Co.2
In Pollard the trial court found that Pollard had shown pretext and consequent
discrimination, because Pollard was able to show that the defendant had fired him on
the basis of a mistaken belief. Pollard had asked for leave, a request the defendant
denied. Subsequently, on the week Pollard had requested leave, he was absent from
work due to an injured ankle.' The defendant investigated, but the "investigation
went nowhere."' Because of the coincidence of the dates and an earlier incident with
an injury, the defendant's personnel manager believed Pollard had lied about the injury
and fired him on the basis of that belief. Because Pollard was able to show that the
defendant's explanation was not based in fact, the trial court found for Pollard. The
appeals court reversed the trial court because that court "confused mistake with
'pretext'....... We do not remand, because the finding that Vachon and the other
managers
believed that Pollard was able to work the week of July 23 ends the
30
case.,

In McCoy the defendant employer, WGN, first demoted McCoy and then subsequently terminated him. 3 ' WGN later hired a younger consultant to perform McCoy's
tasks. 32 At the time of his termination McCoy was forty-six. 3 3 McCoy sued under the

ADEA', and at trial presented evidence that contradicted all of the defendant's proffered reasons in an attempt to avoid summary judgment. McCoy further argued that the
defendant's reasons were so implausible that they must raise an inference of pretext.

23. Pollard v. REA Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (characterizing an earlier 7th Circuit case, Bechold v. IGW Systems, Inc., 817 F.2d 1282, 1285 (7th Cir. 1987)).
24. Kariotis, 131 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997). Kariotis exemplifies the application of precedent developed under Title VII litigation being applied to discrimination claims under other statutes. Kariotis
filed suit under the ADA, the ADEA, ERISA, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA), and an Illinois statute. The court applied the Title VII framework to all of the federal
claims. This Note will accept this assumption and will treat precedent under each statute as being applicable to all without noting the particular statute.
25. Id. at 676.
26. Pollard, 824 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1987).
27. McCoy, 957 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1992).
28. Pollard, 824 F.2d at 559.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. McCoy, 957 F.2d at 370.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The McDonell Douglas burden shifting framework is common to several discrimination statutes, and analysis under one applies equally to the others; see supra. note 24.
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With respect to one of the defendant's four reasons, the court said: "it is undisputed
that WGN had some level of concern with McCoy's performance.... Whether or not
that level of concern was justified given McCoy's actual performance is irrelevant.""
The court continued: "felven if the performance concern was a complete mistake, even
if McCoy was the best possible person for the job, so long as WGN honestly believed
he was not its business judgment will not be second-guessed by federal courts applying
the ADEA."
In Kariotis, the plaintiff was fired because the defendant believed that she had
engaged in disability fraud on the basis of an inaccurate investigation.' Kariotis was
initially granted disability leave in order to have knee replacement surgery.' After the
surgery Kariotis required additional procedures and her leave was extended."' The
human resources manager at Navistar became suspicious of Kariotis' leave and investigated.' On the basis of an insufficient investigation Navistar fired Kariotis."'
Kariotis brought suit under several federal statutes, including the ADA, and one state
statute.42 At trial Kariotis successfully attacked the factual basis for the defendant's
decision, and attempted to use the inadequacy of the investigation as evidence from
which an inference of pretext could be drawn. The trial court disagreed, granting summary judgment to the the defendant, and the appeals court affirmed: "[iun the end, we
are left with Kariotis' theory that the company's investigation was so impulsive and
shoddy that it reeks of discriminatory intent-a theory that we rejected in Pollard...
and one which we reject today."'
Thus, once a defendant offers an explanation for its actions, and asserts that it
honestly believed in that explanation, the Seventh Circuit will not allow a plaintiff to
dispute the validity of that belief by attacking its unreasonableness, or use that unreasonableness to support an inference of discrimination. "[T]he issue of pretext does not
address the correctness or desirability of reasons offered for employment decisions.
Rather, it addresses the issue of whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons
it offers. " ' Honest belief is therefore effectively a complete defense to a claim of
pretext under the Seventh Circuit's application of the rule.
B. The Sixth Circuit's Position
The Sixth Circuit first addressed this issue in the ADA context in Smith v.
Chrysler Corp.' In deciding Smith, the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the Seventh
Circuit's approach.'
The court in Smith drew on an earlier Sixth Circuit decision applying a similar
defense in the context of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973f In Pesterfield v. 7VA' the
35. McCoy, 957 F.2d at 373.
36. Id.
37. Kariotis, 131 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that "the company's investigation was
'imprudent, ill-informed, and inaccurate').
38. Id. at 674.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 675.
42. Id. (the ADA, ADEA, ERISA, COBRA, and the Illinois Health Insurance Claim Filing Act).
43. Id. at 678.
44. McCoy, 957 F.2d at 373.
45. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998).
46. Id. at 806.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
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plaintiff suffered from a series of problems that eventually led to a period of hospitalization.' Following hospitalization, Pesterfield's doctor wrote a letter to the TVA
about Pesterfield's ability to return to work. ° The letter described Pesterfield's medical condition, and concluded that "[alt the present time, he seems unable to return [to
work]." 5 ' Based on this letter the TVA concluded that Pesterfield could not return to
work and terminated him. 2 At trial Pesterfield introduced his doctor's testimony to
the effect that TVA might have misinterpreted the letter.5 The court decided that
TVA's adverse employment decision was made in good faith, despite the doctor's testimony, because the language in the doctor's letter gave the TVA a reasonable basis
for making its decision.54
The Smith court decided that the Pesterfield analysis was relevant to ADA claims
because so much other ADA analysis tracks the analysis of claims under other discrimination statutes. 55 The court also found that the reasonable basis analysis honored the
policy under the ADA that employment decisions be made on the basis of fact rather
than stereotype.' The court concluded that in order to take advantage of the "honest
belief' rule an employer "must be able to establish its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made." "[Tihe key
inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision
before taking an adverse employment decision.""8
The Sixth Circuit in Smith concisely stated the split between itself and the Seventh Circuit: "[t]o the extent the Seventh Circuit's application of the 'honest belief'
rule credits an employer's belief without requiring that it be reasonably based on par'
ticularized facts rather than on ignorance and mythology, we reject its approach."59
IV. Discussion
The issue can be succinctly stated as: may a defendant defeat a plaintiffs attempt to show pretext by asserting its honest belief in its proffered nondiscriminatory
reasons, despite the absence of any articulable facts that would provide a reasonable
basis for that belief.
The Sixth Circuit answers in the negative: in order for a defendant to successfully assert its honest belief in its reasons, such reasons must be objectively reasonable. If
an "employer failed to make a reasonably informed and considered decision before
taking its adverse employment action ...then any reliance placed by the employer in
such a process cannot be said to be honestly held.' "wThe Seventh Circuit, by contrast,
will not allow a plaintiff to show pretext by attacking the reasonableness of the

48. Pesterfield v. TVA, 941 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 438.
50. Id.
St. Id. at 439.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 440.
54. Id. at 443-44.
55. Smith, 155 F.3d at 807 (quoting Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177
(6th Cir. 1996)).
56. Id. at 806.
57. Id. at 807.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 806.
60. Id. at 807.
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defendant's proffered reasons.6' The Seventh Circuit therefore requires that a plaintiff
show something more than just a lack of basis in fact to show pretext.62
A. Summary Judgment
The difference is not one of theoretical niceties. As Kariotis demonstrates, depending on which standard a court chooses to measure a plaintiff's evidence, that
plaintiff may lose on a motion for summary judgment without ever having a fact-finder
weigh the issues of credibility so crucial to a finding of intent. As the Seventh Circuit
noted in McCoy, "[slummary judgment is only appropriate when the record reveals that
no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. .

.

. However, this general

standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where intent
is inevitably the central issue." '
The Sixth Circuit's approach to the "honest belief' rule respects the showing that
a plaintiff must make to survive a motion for summary judgment. The ultimate issue in
a discrimination case is the intent of the defendant, and intent is something that is best
measured by a fact-finder's weighing of credibility. By making a prima facie showing
of possible discrimination at the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, and
then by successfully calling the defendant's stated motives into question, the plaintiff
establishes a dispute over a question of fact (the defendant's intent) that cannot be
resolved without weighing the credibility of both parties.'
Summary judgment is based on the evidence presented and the permissible inferences therefrom that a reasonable fact-finder might draw in the nonmoving party's
favor; it does not deal with an evaluation of the credibility of that evidence or those
inferences.6 At the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework then, the prima facie evidence, the evidence of a lack of a factual basis for the defendant's stated
reasons, and the question about the validity of the defendant's asserted honest belief all
raise issues that can only be resolved by weighing the credibility of the parties. Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate, even where the defendant has asserted an
honest belief, if the validity of that belief is questionable. In allowing the plaintiff to
raise this issue by arguing the unreasonableness of the defendant's belief, the Sixth
Circuit's approach respects the evidentiary requirements of summary judgment without
imposing a greater burden.
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit's approach raises the evidentiary barrier higher
than necessary and allows the granting of summary judgment in the defendant's favor

61. See supra notes 23-32.
62. Readers will recognize the pretext-only versus pretext-plus discussion in microcosm here. This
discussion does have roots in that larger discussion but the author prefers to keep the scope of this
Note limited to the issue of reasonableness as grounds for supporting a showing of "honest belief."
For a discussion of the larger issue, see Lanctot, supra note 5.
63. McCoy, 957 F.2d at 370-71 (noting also that "summary judgment [is] 'notoriously
inappropriate' where intent [is] at issue").
64. This is not to resurrect the presumption of discrimination that the prima facie showing first
created. See Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, and Hicks, 509 U.S. 502. However, even

though the presumption has disappeared, the evidence that gave rise to the presumption can still be
taken into account in deciding the issue of discriminatory intent. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.10

(rebuttal of the presumption raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case does not mean that that evidence,
and the inferences therefrom, cannot be evaluated in deciding whether the defendant's rebuttal was
pretextual).
65. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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even though there is a legitimate issue of fact, namely the actual honesty of the
defendant's asserted "honest belief." This reasoning is inconsistent with the requirements for surviving summary judgment, as well as the Supreme Court's decisions in
Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 6 United States Postal Service Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens,"7 and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks."
B. Consistency With the Jurisprudence of McDonnell Douglas
These three cases have engendered much dispute over what sort of evidentiary
showing a plaintiff must make in order to recover for discrimination.' This Note will
not explore the arguments surrounding pretext-only or pretext-plus with respect to
discrimination actions. However, the decisions in these three cases support the argument that the position of the Sixth Circuit is more consistent with existing law than
that of the Seventh Circuit.
In Burdine, the Supreme Court reversed an appeals court decision that required
the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.7" The Court reiterated its decision with respect to the employer's burdens from McDonnell Douglas: the defendant must "ar7
ticulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." ' The
"plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove ... that the legitimate reasons offered.., were a pretext for discrimination."72
In Aikens, the Supreme Court concluded, inter alia, that the factfinder (the district court) erred in requiring the plaintiff in a Title VII case to present direct evidence
of discriminatory intent in order to make a prima facie showing.73 The Court reiterated that a plaintiff may succeed, after a prima facie showing, by either directly persuading the court that a discriminatory motive was behind the employer's action, or by
showing that the employer's stated reasons are not believable.74
In Hicks, the Court reversed an appeals court decision that granted judgment as a
matter of law where the plaintiff had shown that the defendant's expanations were
pretextual.75 The decision in Hicks was not about the amount of proof a plaintiff must
show in order to win a verdict of discrimination, but rather the amount and kind of
proof that a plaintiff must show in order to win a motion for summary judgment. Under Hicks, a plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a showing of
pretext. However, the factfinder is still entitled to find for the plaintiff on a showing of
pretext alone, as allowed by McDonnell Douglas. Hicks does not require that a plaintiff
do more than raise an issue as to the believabiity of the defendant's proffered reasons
in order to get to the factfinder.
By not allowing the plaintiff to attack the unreasonableness of the employer's
explanation, the Seventh Circuit effectively requires the plaintiff to directly prove that

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
See the discussion supra, notes 5 and 62.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717.
Id.at 716.
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509.
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the employer had another (discriminatory) reason for acting. Further, by granting summary judgment for the employer despite evidence that the employer's reasons may be
unworthy of credence, the Seventh Circuit denies the plaintiff the opportunity to reach
and persuade a factfinder that a discriminatory intent lay behind the employer's actions
because the employer is unbelievable. The Seventh Circuit therefore effectively prohibits the plaintiff from showing discrimination indirectly.
C. Consistency With the Policy Objectives of the ADA
Further, the policy that underlies the ADA is one of prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of disability. One aspect of this policy is the determination that stereotypes of
disability are themselves harmful. People with disabilities should not be discriminated
against based on unfounded fear, prejudice, ignorance, or mythologies but on the relevant medical evidence and the abilities they have. 6 The ADA is designed not only to
remedy discrimination against a person who is in fact disabled, but to uproot reliance
on stereotypes generally. The ADA defines prohibited activity, in part, as "utilizing
standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discrimination
on the basis of disability."' The ADA also defines disability, in part, as "being regarded as having such an impairment [as defined in § 12102(2)(A)]." It is possible
therefore for a person who is not disabled in reality to maintain an ADA claim on the
basis of an employer's unfounded belief alone. 9 The implication of both of these sections is that it is possible to not only be intentionally discriminatory in the traditional
Title VII meaning, but to also be recklessly or even negligently discriminatory, at least
with respect to the ADA.
The Sixth Circuit's approach to the "honest belief' rule is more consistent with
this policy than is that of the Seventh Circuit. By requiring that a defendant be able to
point to particular facts on which it reasonably relied when making its decision, the
Sixth Circuit in effect prohibits the defendant from making such decisions recklessly
(or negligently). Smith demonstrates the appropriateness of this approach in the context
of stereotyped beliefs about disabilities.
One of the two reasons that the employer in Smith put forward as justification
for its firing of Smith was that he had lied on an initial employment form.' Smith
denied suffering from unusual tiredness or fatigue on the employment form and then
subsequently requested accomodation for narcolepsy. The manager who made the
decision to fire Smith decided that because, in her personal opinion, people with narcolepsy suffered from unusal tiredness that Smith had lied on the employment form.'
The court decided that an uninformed personal opinion, based on common lay beliefs
about people with narcolepsy, was not reliable enough to justify the defendant's decision to fire Smith. 2 This sort of "honestly believed" idea about what narcoleptics do
and do not suffer from is one of the aspects of discrimination that the ADA was designed to overcome. Asking that a defendant make "reasonably informed and consid-

76.
77.
78.

See statement of Sen. Harkin, supra note 4.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).

79.

See, e.g., Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 160 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 1998). supra note 3.

80. Smith, 155 F.3d at 804 (lying on a self-administered medical history form).
81. Id. at 808.
82. Id. at 808. However, the court found that Smith was not able to overcome the defendant's
other nondiscriminatory reason for firing him and affirmed the lower court's decision against Smith.
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ered decisions"" is consistent with the underlying policy of the ADA and the explicit
provisions of the law itself.
The Seventh Circuit's approach, because it allows a defendant to avoid liability
so long as it "honestly believes" unfounded stereotypes about disabled people is not
consistent with the ADA. If the Sixth Circuit had applied the Seventh Circuit's rule to
Chrysler's decision with respect to its belief that Smith lied about suffering from unusual tiredness, Chrysler would avoid liability for an action founded on a stereotyped
image of narcoleptics.
Because the Sixth Circuit's approach to the issue of "honest belief' in the context of a pretext showing properly allows the plaintiff to survive a motion for summary
judgment by the defendant while respecting the Supreme Court's admonition from
Hicks 4 that a showing of falsity does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to judgment
as a matter of law and respects the underlying policy concerns of the ADA, that approach is preferable to the Seventh Circuit's approach.
V. Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit's approach to the "honest belief' rule is more consistent with
both the evidentiary requirements of summary judgment, the Supreme Court's decisions in Mcdonnell Douglas and its progeny, and the policies that Congress identified
as underlying the Americans with Disabilities Act. Congress should therefore amend
section 103 of the ADA' to explicitly incorporate the Sixth Circuit's version of the
"honest belief' rule as a defense to discrimination claims under the ADA.
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